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Bill of Rights in the Constitution. 4 This is commensurate with the high value historically (and presently) ascribed to religious and related rights in free, open and democratic societies worldwide. The modest aim of the present contribution is not to try and give a full picture of South Africa's constitutional jurisprudence on these rights to date, or to identify similarities and differences with the position and with events elsewhere in the world. 5 In the discussion that will follow the emphasis will be on jurisprudence of mainly the Constitutional Court, engendered by its adjudication of the (seemingly) eccentric claims of 'religious Others' and culminating in the benchmark judgment in the case of
KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 6 (hereafter Pillay case). It will be shown that this judgment not only represents a high point in the adjudication of constitutional entitlements of religious (and cultural) Others, but also has the potential to contribute significantly to the growth of a jurisprudence sensitive to both the predicaments and legitimate constitutional entitlements of unconventional, 'nonmainstream' claimants of religious rights and freedom. This jurisprudence, it will be argued, has the makings of a jurisprudence of difference taking its cue from what some political theorists have referred to as a politics of difference.
Constitutional guarantees of religious and related rights
What this means will be explained in section 4 below.
A bird's-eye view of constitutional provisions dealing directly with religious rights and freedoms is needed to be able to survey constitutional jurisprudence on the entitlements of religious Others.
Section 15(1) is the Constitution's most salient freedom of religion clause guaranteeing everyone's "right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, 4 Ch 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (hereafter the Constitution). 5
For full(-er) account cf eg 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC). 7
Young Justice.
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12/360 belief and opinion". Equal in status and significance is section 9(1) guaranteeing everyone's equality before and equal protection and benefit of the law, read with section 9(3) explicitly proscribing unfair discrimination "against anyone" on the grounds of, amongst others, religion, conscience and belief.
'Equality' in section 9(1) doubtlessly includes the equality and equal treatment of dissimilar religions and their adherents.
Other provisions in the Bill of Rights qualify, amplify, contextualise and direct the basic section 15(1) and sections 9(1) and 9(3) entitlements to religious freedom and equality in various ways:
2.1 Section 15(2) allows for the conduct of religious observances at state or state-aided institutions, provided that they take place on an equitable basis, 8 rules made by appropriate public authorities are followed 9 and attendance at them is free and voluntary. 10 2.4 Section 31(1) of the Constitution augments the guarantee of religious freedom rights in section 15(1) and religious equality in sections 9(1) and 9(3) with constitutionally entrenched backing to practice religion 2.2 The right to establish and maintain, at own expense, independent educational institutions -including, for instance religiously and/or denominationally specific schools -is entrenched in section 29(3). Such institutions may not discriminate on the basis of race, must be registered with the state and must maintain standards not inferior to those at comparable public educational institutions.
Section 15(3)(a) of the Constitution authorises legislation recognising
marriages concluded under systems of religious personal or family law.
S 15(2)(b). 9 S 15(2)(a). 10 S 15(2)(c).
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communally, that is, as a "group activity or pursuit". 15/360 judgment on religious rights, but due to certain adverse circumstances this was not to be. First, the full record of the evidence before the court a quo was not before the Constitutional Court because the appellant did not follow the proper procedure bringing her case to the latter forum. Second, the Solberg case was not perceived as really dealing with religious freedom, but rather with commercial interests. Solberg, in the first place, challenged section 90(1) as an infringement of her right to participate freely in economic activity.
19
Chaskalson P, speaking on behalf of the four, held that since Solberg's challenge was based on the freedom of religion clause in the transitional Constitution (section 14(1)), it required the court's consideration as a matter of religious free exercise only and not of religious equality and non-discrimination, as contemplated in sections 8(1) and (2) of that Constitution, too.
The
Constitutional Court unanimously held that there was no merit in this challenge.
This left Solberg with a challenge based on the protection of the right to freedom of religion, a concern she had most certainly not seriously contemplated when she sold wine on a Sunday. It requires in addition that the legislature refrain from favouring one religion over others. Fairness and even-handedness in relation to diverse religions is a necessary component of freedom of religion. 
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It may be mentioned in passing that the Solberg court was unanimous on one issue of considerable significance (though not immediately relevant to the present discussion), namely the absence, in the (transitional) Constitution, of an 'establishment clause' erecting a wall of separation between church and state. In a significant postscript to his judgment, Sachs J lamented the fact that there was no one before the court representing the interests of the children concerned.
32
In spite of the fact that Christian Education had the effect of restraining the free exercise of a religious belief, it is a judgment in which the significance of religious and related rights is stated most unequivocally -as appears from the tenor of the second of the two dicta cited at the beginning of this article.
He thought that the children, many of them in their late teens and coming from a highly conscientised community, would have been capable of articulate expression:
Although both the state and the parents were in a position to speak on their behalf, neither was able to speak in their name.
It would therefore have been advisable, he opined, to have appointed a curator ad litem to represent the interests of the children whose contribution would have "enriched the dialogue". [T]he appellant belongs to a minority group. The constitutional right asserted by the appellant goes beyond his own interest -it affects the Rastafari community. The Rastafari community is not a powerful one. It is a vulnerable group. It deserves the protection of the law precisely because it is a vulnerable minority. The very fact that Rastafari use cannabis exposes them to social stigmatisation…Our Constitution recognises that minority groups may hold their own religious views and enjoins us to tolerate and protect such views. However, the right to freedom of religion is not absolute. While members of a religious community may not determine for themselves which laws they will obey and which they will not, the state should, where it is reasonably possible, seek to avoid putting the believers to a choice between their faith and respect for the law.
39
The Constitutional Court thus made an attempt to accommodate concerns of a vulnerable, religious minority, but did not fully deliver on the promise that its effort held, for its final (majority) judgment went against Prince. 
MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal v Pillay
The ratio underlying the majority of the court's final decision is that it is impossible for state agencies involved in enforcing the overall statutory prohibition on the use of dagga, to make allowance for the use of small quantities of this prohibited substance for religious purposes without actually compromising the justifiable objectives of the overall prohibition. The minority of the court did not dispute the legitimacy of criminalising the possession and use of dagga in general, but argued that it was feasible for the state agencies involved to lay down and police conditions for Rastafarians' limited use of dagga for religious purposes. "Durban Girls' High School, the school at issue in this case, is one of the exceptions. Although historically it was a school for White girls under apartheid law, that has changed dramatically in the last fifteen years. Now, we were told from the bar, of its approximately 1300 learners, approximately 350 are Black, 350 are Indian, 470 are White and 90 are Coloured. Moreover, it is an educationally excellent school which produces fine matriculation results. It is at the cutting edge of non-racial education, facing the challenges of moving away from its racial past to a non-racial future where young girls, regardless of their colour or background, can be educated. This context is crucial to how we approach this case".
At a school as first-rate as -but with school fees considerably lower than -any prestigious private school, noblesse (still) obliges, and Sunali's school accordingly prides itself on an exemplary Code of Conduct, duly adopted by the governing body in consultation with learners, parents and educators. A learner's parents must sign an undertaking to ensure that their child will comply with the Code, in terms of which wearing a school uniform to school is nonnegotiable. The only jewellery allowed with the school uniform is "[e]ar-rings, plain round studs/sleepers . . . ONE in each ear lobe at the same level" and wrist watches in keeping with the uniform. Especially excluded is "any adornment/bristle which may be in any body piercing". Strict enforcement of these "jewellery rules" sparked the Pillays' dispute with the school.
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Upon reaching physical maturity, and as a form of religious and cultural expression, Sunali had her nose pierced and a gold stud inserted. The school did not take kindly to this contravention of its jewellery stipulations, but gave Sunali permission to wear the stud until the piercing had healed, and then remove it or else face disciplinary proceedings in terms of the Code. Navaneethum Pillay, Sunali's mother, was requested to write a letter to the school explaining why, as a form of religious and cultural expression, Sunali had to wear a nose stud.
In her letter to the school Mrs Pillay explained that they came from a South Indian family and that they intended to maintain their cultural identity by upholding the traditions of the women before them. Insertion of the nose stud is part of a time-honoured family tradition. When a young woman reaches physical maturity her nose is pierced and a stud inserted indicating that she had become eligible for marriage. The practice is meant to honour daughters as responsible young adults. Sunali, Mrs Pillay claimed, wore the nose stud not for fashion purposes, but as part of a religious ritual and a long-standing family tradition, and therefore for cultural reasons too. 
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Sunali an exemption, resulted in discrimination against her. The problem with the Code was that it did not provide for any procedure to obtain exemption from the jewellery stipulations and excluded nose studs from its list of jewellery that may be worn with the school uniform. The Code thus compromised the sincere religious and cultural beliefs or practices of a learner like Sunali, but not those of other learners. This latter group constituted a comparator showing up the discrimination against Sunali and others in a similar position. The court emphasised thatthe norm embodied by the Code is not neutral, but enforces mainstream and historically privileged forms of adornment, such as ear studs which also involve the piercing of a body part, at the expense of minority and historically excluded forms. Accordingly a burden is placed on learners who are unable to express themselves fully and must attend school in an environment that did not completely accept them.
45
The court further pointed out that it did not really make a difference whether the discrimination was on religious or cultural grounds, especially since Sunali was part of a group defined by a combination of religion, language, geographical origin, ethnicity and artistic tradition. See also Young (n 7) 168: "Integration into the full life of the society should not have to imply assimilation to dominant norms and abandonment of group affiliation and culture. If the only alternative to the exclusion of some groups defined as Other by dominant ideologies is the assertion that they are the same as everybody else, then they will continue to be excluded because they are not the same. At the same time, however, religion and culture as grounds on which discrimination can take place should not be collapsed, becausereligion is ordinarily concerned with personal faith and belief, while culture generally relates to traditions and beliefs developed by a community.
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The two can nonetheless overlap, so thatwhile it is possible for a belief or practice to be purely religious or purely cultural, it is equally possible for it to be both religious and cultural. 47 Freedom is one of the underlying values of our Bill of Rights and courts must interpret all rights to promote the underlying values of 'human dignity, equality and freedom'. These values are not mutually exclusive but enhance and reinforce each other … . A necessary element of freedom and of dignity of any individual is an 'entitlement to respect for the unique set of ends that the individual pursues.' One of those ends is the voluntary religious and cultural practices in which we participate. That we choose voluntarily rather than through a feeling of obligation only enhances the significance of a practice to our autonomy, our identity and our dignity.
Sunali sincerely believed that wearing a nose stud was part of her religion and culture, but the evidence in the case showed that it was no mandatory tenet of either her religion or her culture. The court, however, thought that this in no way lessened the school's discrimination against her: 48 The State, an employer or a school, must take positive measures and possibly incur additional hardship or expense in order to allow all people to participate and enjoy all their rights equally. It ensures that we do not relegate people to the margins of society because they do not or cannot conform to certain social norms.
In considering whether the discrimination against Sunali was unfair, the court (also) explored the notion of "reasonable accommodation" concluding that its absence in casu rendered the discrimination against Sunali unfair: 49 But then, of course, there is always the "slippery slope" scenario or, worse, the "parade of horribles" which may, in other cases, turn the tiny gold nose stud Firstly, this judgment applies only to bona fide religious and cultural practices. It says little about other forms of expression. The possibility for abuse should not affect the rights of those who hold sincere beliefs. Secondly, if there are other learners who hitherto were afraid to express their religions or cultures and who will now be encouraged to do so, that is something to be celebrated, not feared. As a general rule, the more learners feel free to express their religions and cultures in school, the closer we will come to the society envisaged in the Constitution. The display of religion and culture in public is not a "parade of horribles" but a pageant of diversity which will enrich our schools and in turn our country. A goal of social justice . . . is social equality. Equality refers not primarily to the distribution of social goods, though distributions are certainly entailed by social equality. It refers primarily to the full participation and inclusion of everyone in a society's major institutions, and the socially supported substantive opportunity for all to develop and exercise their capacities and realize their choices.
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For Sunali Pillay, distribution had determined access to a "privileged school context", but full participation and unconstrained inclusion finally had to determine the meaningfulness of her "presence" as beneficiary-Other in that context. The achievement of such quality participation, calls for memory of a history of denied participation and decided exclusion of the Other, as the 53 Young (n 7). 54 In the judgement itself only passing reference is made to s 7(2) and then not in a context where any of the main issues in the case is dealt with; cf MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 40 n 18. 55 Young (n 7) 173. 56 That a politics (or jurisprudence) of difference is not unproblematic without ado and may result in an (unwanted) 'over-inclusion' of the Other not duly honouring her/his difference or 'otherness' is, as Lindahl "Recognition" convincingly argues, a possibility that (also) ought to be reckoned with -but this, I would suggest, was not the outcome in Pillay.
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The protection of voluntary as well as obligatory practices also conforms to the Constitution's commitment to affirming diversity. It is a commitment that is totally in accord with this nation's decisive break from its history of intolerance and exclusion. Differentiating between mandatory and voluntary practices does not celebrate or affirm diversity, it simply permits it. That falls short of our constitutional project which not only affirms diversity, but promotes and celebrates it. We cannot celebrate diversity by permitting it only when no other option remains.
so aptly explains:
58
The Pillay judgment is not perfect in every way and some of the conceptual and 
Conclusion
The Constitutional Court's jurisprudence in relation to issues of identity and difference has increasingly been interrogating, with transformative rigour, 'mainstream' preferences and prejudices regarding the organisation of societal life, inspired by a desire to proceed beyond -and 'not again' to resurrect -all that used to contribute to and sustain marginalisation of the Other. In this article I showed how this has happened in cases dealing with the right to freedom of religion (and related rights). (Strydom case) where the court was called upon to decide whether it was permissible for a congregation to terminate the services of the head of its "art academy" who openly entered into a gay relationship. The complainant instituted proceedings on the basis that he was discriminated against unfairly, while the congregation maintained that it was acting in terms of its religious beliefs and therefore exercised its religious freedom as sustained by the Constitution. The court found in favour of the complainant. The question is: was it justified to give a judgment effectively rejecting the church's case based on its "doctrinal beliefs" about homosexuality?
Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister
In the wake of cases such as Fourie and Pillay (and Strydom) rigorous debate has been taking place on public platforms about taboos formerly relegated to (and hidden away in) "the private sphere". The bold assertions of the Constitutional Court on the affirmation and celebration of the Other, challenge all religions with simultaneously lofty and magnanimous ideas about "doing unto Others" to make themselves heard as well, for "our Constitution does not tolerate diversity as a necessary evil, but affirms it as one of the primary treasures of our nation" 69 and "neither the Equality Act 70 nor the Constitution require (sic!) identical treatment. They require equal concern and equal respect". 
